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ABSOLUTE AND STATISTICAL UNIVERSALS 
 
  Language universals are statements that are true of all languages, for 
example: “all languages have stop consonants”. But beneath this simple definition 
lurks deep ambiguity, and this triggers misunderstanding in both interdisciplinary 
discourse and within linguistics itself.  A core dimension of the ambiguity is 
captured by the opposition “absolute vs. statistical universal”, although the 
literature uses these terms in varied ways. Many textbooks draw the boundary 
between absolute and statistical according to whether a sample of languages 
contains exceptions to a universal. But the notion of an exception-free sample is not 
very revealing even if the sample contained all known languages: there is always a 
chance that an as yet undescribed language, or an unknown language from the 
past or future, will provide an exception.  
  It is impossible, in principle, to survey all languages of our species. If we 
nevertheless want to make claims about all languages, only two routes are open: a 
priori deduction of necessarily true statements, or statistical extrapolation from 
empirical samples to the entire set. Absolute universals can then be defined as 
those that are necessarily true, statistical universals as those that are extrapolated 
from samples.  
 
 
Absolute Universals 
 
  For statements to be necessarily true, they must follow from a priori 
assumptions. The assumptions that linguists make are diverse and heavily debated. 
An example is the assumption that WORDS consist of MORPHEMES, i.e. minimal form-
meaning pairs. If one accepts this, then it is necessarily true that all languages have 
morphemes, and there cannot be exceptions. Why? Suppose someone claims to 
have discovered a language without morphemes. One can of course simply 
analyze the language without mentioning morphemes, but obviously that cannot 
challenge the universal just because one can always defend it by re-analyzing the 
language with morphemes. The only true challenge would be to show that 
analyzing some data in terms of morphemes leads to structures that are in conflict 
with other assumptions, e.g. that form-meaning pairs combine exclusively by linear 
concatenation. The conflict can be illustrated by languages with morphologies like 
the English plural geese, where the meanings “plural” and “goose” do not 
correspond to linear strings of morphemes. Confronted with such data, there are 
three options: (i) give up the notion of morpheme; (ii) give up the assumption of 
linear concatenation; (iii) add additional assumptions that reconcile the conflict. On 
any of these options, the universal remains exceptionless: on solution (i), no language has morphemes; on solutions (ii) and (iii), all languages have 
morphemes. As a result, absolute universals can never be falsified by individual 
data. Their validity can only be evaluated by exploring whether they are consistent 
with other absolute universals that are claimed simultaneously.  
  Absolute universals can also be thought of as those aspects of one’s 
descriptive metalanguage — often called a “theoretical framework” — that are 
necessarily referred to in the analysis of every language, i.e that constitute the 
descriptive a priori. Depending on one’s a priori, this includes, apart from the 
morpheme, such notions as distinctive feature, constituent, argument, predicate, 
reference, agent, speaker, etc. In some metalanguages, the a priori also includes 
more specific assumptions, e.g. that constituents can only be described by uniform 
branching (all to the left, or all to the right), or only by binary branching, etc. 
  The status of absolute universals is controversial. For many linguists, especially 
in TYPOLOGY and HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS, absolute universals are simply the 
descriptive a priori, with no additional claim on biological or psychological reality. 
The choice between equally consistent universals/metalanguages — e.g. between 
options (i) – (iii) in the example above — is guided by their success in describing 
structures and in defining variables that capture distributional patterns — an 
evaluation procedure comparable to how technical instruments for analyzing 
objects are evaluated in the natural sciences. In the morphology problem from 
before, typologists would most likely chose option (ii) — because it allows defining 
a variable of stem-internal vs. affixal plural realization that has an interesting 
distribution (suggesting, for example, that within-stem realization is favored by a 
few families in Africa and the Near East). 
  In GENERATIVE GRAMMAR, by contrast, absolute universals are not only thought 
of as descriptively a priori but also as biologically given in what is called 
UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR: they are claimed to be innate and to be identical to the 
generalizations that a child makes when learning language. Thus, if the morpheme 
is accepted as a universal, i.e. a priori term of our metalanguage, it will also be 
claimed to be part of what makes languages LEARNABLE and to be part of our 
genetic endowment. An immediate consequence of such an approach is that 
something can be claimed as universal even if it is not in fact necessary in the 
analysis of every language. For example, even if some language (e.g. the Rotokas 
language of Bougainville) lacks evidence for nasal sounds, one could still include a 
distinctive feature [±nasal] in Universal Grammar. Rotokas speakers are then said 
to have the feature as part of their genetic endowment even if they don’t use it.  
  This view of absolute universals is highly controversial: many linguists limit 
absolute universals to what is descriptively necessary in every language; many 
psychologists propose that children apply different and much more general 
principles in AQUIRING A LANGUAGE than those found in linguists’ metalanguages; 
and to date no absolute universal has been confirmed by genetic research.  
 
 
Statistical Universals 
 
  What is not an absolute universal is a variable (or character, or PARAMETER): 
some languages have a certain structure or they don’t have it, or to different degrees. Interestingly, most variables show some skewing in their distribution: some 
values of a variable are favored only in certain geographical areas (relative 
pronouns in Europe) or only in certain families (stem-internal inflection in 
Afroasiatic). But some values are globally favored (e.g. nasals), or, what is more 
typical, globally favored under certain structural conditions (e.g. postnominal 
relative clauses among languages with objects following the verb). These global 
preferences are called unconditional (unrestricted) and conditional (restricted) 
statistical universals, respectively. (An alternative term for conditional statistical 
universals is IMPLICATIONAL UNIVERSAL, but this invites confusion because their 
probablistic nature differentiates them from logical implications; cf. Cysouw 2005) 
  Statistical universals are mostly motivated by theories of how languages 
develop, how they are used, how they are learned, and how they are processed. 
One such theory, for example, proposes that processing preferences in the brain 
lead to a universal increase in the odds for postnominal structures among verb-
object languages (Hawkins 2004). 
  Statistical universals take the same forms as statistical hypotheses in any other 
science — for example, they can be formulated in terms of regression models. They 
can be tested with the same range of statistical methods as in any other science, 
and, again as in other sciences, the appropriate choice of models, population 
assumptions, and testing methods is an issue of ongoing research (e.g. Cysouw 
2005, Janssen et al. 2006, Maslova 2007). 
  A central concern when testing statistical universals is to ascertain true 
globality, i.e. independence of area and family. Areas can be controlled for by 
standard factorial analysis, but it is an unsettled question just what the relevant 
areal relations are: for example, should one control for the influence of Europe or 
the entire Eurasia or both? A quick solution is to assume a standard set of five or 
six macro-areas in the world and accept as universal if a distribution is independent 
of these (Dryer 1989). But the rationale for such a set is problematic, and this has 
lead to a steep surge of interest in research on areas and their historical 
background (e.g. Nichols 1992, Haspelmath et al. 2005).  
  Controlling for family relations poses another problem. Under standard 
statistical procedures one would draw random samples of equal size within each 
family and then model families as levels of a factor. However, over a third of all 
known families are isolates, containing only one member each. And picking one 
member at random in larger families is impossible if at the same time one wants to 
control for areas (e.g. admitting an Indo-European language from both Europe 
and South Asia). In response to this problem, typologists seek to ensure 
representativity of a sample not by random selection within families but by 
exhaustive sampling of known families, stratified by area. In order to then control 
for unequal family sizes, one usually admits only as datapoints per family as there 
are different values on the variables of interest (Dryer 1989, Bickel 2007). 
  Samples that are not based on random sampling do not support parametric 
inference by statistical tests. An alternative to this is randomization methods 
(Janssen et al. 2006): the null hypothesis in these methods is that an observed 
preference can be predicted from the totals of the sample (e.g. that an observed 
90% postnominal relatives in VO languages could be predicted if 90% of the 
entire sample had postnominal relatives) — not that the sample stems from a population without the observed preference. Extrapolation to the total population 
(the entire of set of human languages) can then only be based on plausibility 
arguments: if a preference significantly deviates from what is expected from the 
totals of the observed sample, it is likely that the preference holds in all languages. 
A key issue in such argumentation is whether the tested variables are sufficiently 
unstable over time so that a present sample can be assumed to not reflect 
accidental population skewings from early times in prehistory (Maslova 2000). In 
response to this, typologists now also seek to test universals by sampling language 
changes instead of language states — a move that is sometimes called the 
“dynamization” of typology (Greenberg 1995, Croft 2003).   
  While the number of proposed statistical universals is impressive — the 
Universals Archive at Konstanz has collected over 2000 (Plank & Filimonova 
2000) —, very few of them have been rigorously tested for independence of area, 
family, and time.  
 
 
— Balthasar Bickel 
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